Unanswered quibbles: George Selgin still gets it wrong with fractional reserve free banking

Authors

  • Philipp Bagus Assistant Professor, Department of Applied Economics, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos.
  • David Howden Assistant Professor of Economics at St. Louis University-Madrid Campus, Madrid, Spain.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v8i2.248

Abstract

In this article we reply to George Selgin’s counterarguments to our article «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin regards holding cash as saving while we focus on the real savings necessary to maintain investment projects. Real savings are unconsumed real income. Variations in real savings are not necessarily equal to variations in cash holdings. We show that a coordinated credit expansion in a fractional reserve free banking (FRFB) system is possible and that precautionary reserves consequently do not pose a necessary limit. We discuss various instances in which a FRFB system may expand credit without a prior increase in real savings. These facets all demonstrate why a fractional reserve banking system —even a free banking one— is inherently unstable, and incentivized to impose a stabilizing central bank. We find that at the root of our disagreements with Selgin lies a different approach to monetary theory. Selgin subscribes to the aggregative equation of exchange, which impedes him from seeing the microeconomic problems that the stabilization of «MV» by a FRFB system causes.

Key words: Free banking, fractional reserve, monetary equilibrium, credit expansion, economic cycle.

JEL Classification: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34.

Resumen: En este artículo respondemos a George Selgin, que a su vez respondió a nuestro artículo «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin considera que los saldos de tesorería son ahorros, mientras nosotros nos fijamos en los ahorros reales necesarios para mantener proyectos de inversion. Ahorros reales son ingresos reales no consumidos. Variaciones en los ahorros reales no necesariamente coinciden con las variaciones en los saldos de tesoreria. Mostramos que una expansión crediticia coordinada es posible en un sistema bancario de reserva fraccionaria (FRFB) y que las reservas prudenciales no constituyen necesariamente un limite a la expansión co - ordinada. Discutimos varios escenarios en los que el sistema FRFB puede expandir los créditos sin un aumento previo en los ahorros reales. Todas estas facetas muestran que un sistema bancario de reservas fraccionarias —incluso uno de banca libre— es inherentemente inestable y produce incentivos para imponer un banco central estabilizador. Mostramos que el origen de nuestras diferencias con Selgin está en un enfoque diferente a la teoría monetaria. Selgin es partidario de la ecuación de intercambio que es muy agregada y que le impide ver los problemas microeconomicas que la estabilización de «MV» por parte del sistema FRFB produce.

Palabras clave: Banca libre, reserva fraccionaria, equilibrio monetario, expansión crediticia, ciclo económico.

Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34.

References

ANDERSON, BENJAMIN M. ([1917] 1999): The Value of Money. Repr. Grove City, Penn.: Libertarian Press.

—(1979): Economics and the Public Welfare: A Financial and Economic History of the United States, 1914-1946. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Press.

BAGUS, PHILIPP (2009): «The Quality of Money». Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 12 (4): 22-45.

—(2010): «Austrian Business Cycle Theory: Are 100 Percent Sufficient to Prevent a Business Cycle». Libertarian Papers, 2 (2):

BAGUS, PHILIPP and DAVID HOWDEN (2009): «The Legitimacy of Loan Maturity Mismatching: A Risky, but not Fraudulent, Undertaking», Journal of Business Ethics 90(3), 399-406.

—(2010a): «Fractional Reserve Free banking: Some Quibbles.» Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 13(4): 29-55.

—(2010b): «The Term Structure of Savings, the Yield Curve, and Maturity Mismatching». Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 13(3): 64-85.

—(2011): «The Economic and Legal Significance of «Full» De-posit Availability». Unpublished manuscript.

—forthcoming a. «Monetary Equilibrium and Price Stickiness: Causes, Consequences and Remedies». The Review of Austrian Economics.

—forthcoming b. «Still Unanswered Quibbles of Fractional Reserve Free Banking». The Review of Austrian Economics.

BAGUS, PHILIPP, DAVID HOWDEN and WALTER E. BLOCK: forthcoming, «Deposits, Loans and Banking: Clarifying the Debate», American Journal of Economics and Sociology.

BOGAERT, RAYMOND (1968): Banques et Banquiers dans les Cités Grecques. Leyden, Holland: A.W. Sijthoff.

BOETTKE, PETER J. (2010): «Fearing Deflation Producing Inflation: Why Hayek Wasn’t Milton Friedman». Coordination Problem blog, Nov. 2nd. [Available] http://www.coordinationproblem.org/2010/11/fearing-deflation-producing-inflation-why-hayek-wasnt-milton-friedman.html

CANNON, JAMES G. (1908): «Clearing Houses and the Currency». In (ed.) E.R.A. Seligman, The Currency Problem and the Present Financial Situation. New York: Columbia University Press. CHECKLAND, SIDNEY G. (1975): Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973. Glasgow: Collins.

CIPOLLA, C.M. (1982): The Monetary Policy of Fourteenth-Century Florence (Berkeley: University of California Press.

EVANS, ANTHONY J. and HORWITZ, STEVEN. forthcoming. «An Appeal for Better Scholarly Discourse: How Bagus and Howden Have it Wrong on Free Banking». The Review of Austrian Economics.

GRIFFIN, EDWARD J. (1998): The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve. 3rd ed. Los Angeles, Ca.: American Media.

GORTON, GARY (1985): «Clearinghouses and the origin of central banking in the United States». The Journal of Economic History 45(2): 277-83.

GORTON, GARY and LIXIN JUANG (2003): «Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking», in (eds.) David R. Altig and Bruce D. Smith, Evolution and Procedures in Central Banking, pp. 181-219. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

GORTON, GARY and DONALD J. MULLINEAUX (1987 [1993]): «The Joint Production Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses». Reprinted in (ed.) Lawrence H. White, Free Banking, Volume II: History, pp. 318-29. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar.

HAZLITT, HENRY (1968): «The Velocity of Circulation», available at http://mises.org/daily/2916.

HORWITZ, STEPHEN (1996): «Capital Theory, Inflation, and Deflation: The Austrians and Monetary Disequilibrium Theory Com-pared.» Journal of the History of Economic Thought 18(2): 287-308.

—(2000): Microfoundations and Macroeconomics: An Austrian perspectives. New York: Routledge.

—(2010): «Knowledge Shifts and the Business Cycle: When Boom Turns to Bust». Review of Austrian Economics 23(2): 165-182.

HÜLSMANN, JÖRG GUIDO (1998): «Toward a General Theory of Error Cycles». Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 1 (4): 1-23.

HUERTA DE SOTO, JESÚS (1998): «A Critical Note on Fractional Reserve Free Banking». Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 1 (4): 25-49.

—(2009): Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles. 2nd ed. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

—(2010): «Algunas reflexiones complementarias sobre la cri-sis y la teoría del ciclo». Procesos de mercado, vol. VII, n.º 2, Autumn, pp. 193-203.

MISES, LUDWIG VON (1980): The Theory of Money and Credit. India-napolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics.

—(1998): Human Action. Scholar’s Ed. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

MUELLER, REINHOLD C. (1997): The Venetian Money Market: Banks Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200-1500. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press.

RALLO, JUAN RAMÓN (2009b): «George Selgin: la confusión entre dinero y ahorro.» Instituto Juan de Mariana. [Available] http://www.juandemariana.org/comentario/3526/george/selgin/confusion/dinero/ahorro/

ROTHBARD, MURRAY N. (1988): «The Myth of Free Banking in Scotland,» Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 2: 229-245.

—(1994): The Case Against the Fed. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

—(2001): Man, Economy, and State. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

SECHREST, LARRY J. (1993 [2008]): Free Banking: Theory, History, and a Laissez-Faire Model. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

SELGIN, GEORGE (1988): The Theory of Free Banking: Money Supply under Competitive Note Issue. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefeld.

—(1990): Praxeology and Understanding. An Analysis of the Controversy in Austrian Economics. Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

—forthcoming. «Mere Quibbles: Bagus and Howden’s Critique of The Theory of Free Banking.» The Review of Austrian Economics. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800813.

U.S. CONGRESS (1913): Congressional Records of the 63rd Congress, 2nd session.

USHER, A.P. (1943): The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

WHITE, LAWRENCE H. (1995): Free Banking in Britain. 2nd ed. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

YEAGER, LELAND B. ([1968] 1997): «Essential Properties of the Me-dium of Exchange». Reprinted in The Fluttering Veil: Essays on Monetary Disequilibrium, (ed.) George Selgin, pp. 87-110. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

—(1997): The fluttering veil: essays on monetary disequilibrium, (ed.) George Selgin. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Downloads

Published

2011-07-01

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Unanswered quibbles: George Selgin still gets it wrong with fractional reserve free banking. (2011). REVISTA PROCESOS DE MERCADO, 8(2), 83-111. https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v8i2.248