Monetary Constitutionalism: Some Recent Developments
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v15i2.48Abstract
The volume edited by Leland Yeager more than 50 years ago and published in 1962 under the title In Search of a Monetary Constitution has turned out to be remarkably prescient since the Great Inflation was then about to begin. One might expect that in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession interest in monetary-constitutional matters would be revived and this has indeed been the case. In this paper an attempt is made to assess whether and to what extent scientific progress has been made in defining the nature and characteristics of a monetary constitution for the post-Crisis world. To that end some recent contributions to the literature are reviewed critically.
Keywords: Constitutionalism, Constitutional Political Economy, Monetary Con-stitution, Monetary Systems.
JEL Classification: B53, E02, E50, H40, P16.
Resumen: El volumen editado por Leland Yeager hace más de 50 años y pub-licado en 1962 con el título In Search of a Monetary Constitution, ha resultado ser notablemente premonitorio, ya que por aquella época iba a comenzar la Gran Inflación. Podría esperarse que, a raíz de la crisis financiera global y la Gran recesión, hubiese aumentado el interés por las cuestiones monetari-as-constitucionales y, efectivamente, este ha sido el caso. En este trabajo se intenta evaluar si, y hasta qué punto, se ha logrado un progreso científico en la definición de la naturaleza y las características de una constitución mone-taria para el mundo posterior a la crisis. Para ello se revisan críticamente algu-nas contribuciones recientes de la literatura.
Palabras clave: Constitucionalismo, Economía Política Constitucional, Con-stitución Monetaria, Sistemas Monetarios.
Clasificación JEL: B53, E02, E50, H40, P16.
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